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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Melvin Arthur McCabe appeals from the judgment entered upon his guilty 
plea to possession of a controlled substance with a sentencing enhancement. 
On appeal, McCabe argues the district court abused its discretion when it failed 
to sua sponte order a mental health evaluation to determine McCabe's 
competency to represent himself. He also argues the district court abused its 
discretion by denying his post-sentencing motion for withdrawal of his guilty plea. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
During an arrest for driving without privileges, law enforcement "removed 
a Marlboro cigarette pack containing a substantial amount of a white crystal 
substance from Mr. McCabe[']s upper left coat pocket." (PSI, p.4.) Additionally, 
McCabe had nine empty plastic bags, a glass pipe with residue, two digital 
scales, and a plastic tube in his possession. (Id.) The state charged McCabe 
with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, driving without 
privileges, possession of drug paraphernalia, failure to provide proof of 
insurance, and being a persistent violator. (R., pp.67-71.) 
The court appointed counsel to represent McCabe. (R., p.30.) 
Subsequent to his preliminary hearing but prior to the district court arraignment, 
counsel for McCabe filed a motion to withdraw upon McCabe's request. (R., 
pp.72-73.) McCabe filed a prose "Notice of Appearance," demanding the right to 
represent himself. (R., pp.78-83.) The court denied the initial motion to 
withdraw, McCabe pied not guilty and the matters were set for trial. (R., p.85.) 
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Counsel for McCabe filed a second motion to withdraw (R., pp.102-104) and the 
court held a hearing to conduct a Faretta 1 inquiry (see generally 3/4/14 
Tr.) prior to issuing an order holding McCabe made "a free and voluntary 
decision to represent himself" and allowing the withdrawal of counsel (R., p.118). 
McCabe pied guilty to an amended charge of possession of a controlled 
substance with a sentencing enhancement. (R., pp.432-433; 5/23/13 Tr., p.23, 
L.3 - p.24, L.9.) The court sentenced McCabe to six years fixed followed by 
eight years indeterminate. (R., p.434; 7/12/13 Tr., p.18, Ls.13-15.) McCabe 
timely filed a notice of appeal. (R., pp.440-442.) 
McCabe filed a motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to Rule 35 
which the court denied without hearing. (R., pp.461-465, 468-474.) Thereafter, 
McCabe filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea "to correct manifest 
injustice." (R., pp.477-483.) Following a hearing on the motion (1/27/14 Tr.), the 
district court issued a memorandum decision denying McCabe's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to I.C.R. 33 (c), finding "no manifest injustice 
ha[d] occurred" (2/3/14 Memorandum Decision2, p.15). 
1 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
2 The district court's order denying McCabe's motion to withdraw augmented the 
record on appeal in this case pursuant to the Supreme Court's April 3, 2014 
Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part the Motion to Augment and to 
Suspend the Briefing Schedule. 
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ISSUES 
McCabe states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to sua 
sponte order a mental health evaluation and make a 
determination as to Mr. McCabe's competency to represent 
himself? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
McCabe's Rule 33(c) motion to with draw [sic] his guilty plea 
and his accompanying motion for a retroactive competency 
evaluation? 
(Appellant's brief, p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has McCabe waived the right to challenge the district court's competency 
determination on appeal through the entry of an unconditional plea of 
guilty? 
2. Has McCabe failed to show the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his post-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea because 
McCabe failed to carry his burden of demonstrating manifest injustice 
entitling him to withdrawal of his plea? 
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ARGUMENTS 
I. 
McCabe Waived The Right To Challenge The Failure Of The Court To Sua 
Sponte Order a Competency Evaluation When He Pied Guilty 
McCabe asserts the district court abused its discretion by failing "to order 
a mental health evaluation to determine his competency to represent himself' 
where "there was substantial evidence that he was incompetent when he waived 
his right to counsel." (Appellant's brief, p.7.) By entering an unconditional plea 
of guilty to the possession of a controlled substance charge (see generally 
5/13/13 Tr.), McCabe waived his right to challenge any alleged failure to order an 
evaluation. See State v. A!-Kotrani, 141 Idaho 66, 68, 106 Idaho P.3d 392, 394 
(Idaho 2005) ("We hold that by his unconditional plea of guilty the Defendant 
waived his right to challenge the district court's competency determination[.]"). 
As discussed below, the trial court found McCabe was competent to 
represent himself at trial and that determination is supported by the record. As 
such, because he entered an unconditional guilty plea, McCabe is prohibited 
from challenging his competency on appeal. 
11. 
McCabe Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying 
His Post-Sentencing Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
A Introduction 
After he was sentenced and his Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence 
was denied, McCabe moved to withdraw his plea on the bases that his plea was 
induced through the threats of an improper application of the persistent violator 
enhancement and his plea was "involuntarily based on a denial of adequate 
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access" to legal resources. (R., pp.478-482.) McCabe contemporaneously filed 
a motion for a retroactive competency evaluation, claiming he was "suffering from 
methamphetamine induced mental incompetence or diminished capacity" at the 
time he pied guilty. (R., p.493.) At a hearing on the motions, McCabe addressed 
his assertion that his plea was constitutionally inadequate because of his history 
of drug use: 
Well, I figured the thing is that when I withdrew my plea, I 
was - I mean when I waived my right to counsel, I was going 
through some withdrawal symptoms and stuff, and I was irrational 
and I really didn't know what l was doing back then, and to couple 
that to my plea creates manifest injustice, I think, in my mind. 
But you know, to - l mean I'm not sure if the psychological 
examination is required, excuse me, but that an expert in that field 
could rationally come to the conclusion that I wasn't in a state - in a 
frame of mind to constitutionally waive my right to counsel at the 
time I waived it, because l was going through withdrawal 
symptoms, you know. 
(1/27/14 Tr., p.25, L.15 - p.26, L.4.) The district court denied the motion, finding 
from its review of the record that there was no occurrence of manifest injustice 
and McCabe's guilty plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. 
(2/3/14 Memorandum Decision, pp.1-15.) 
On appeal, McCabe argues only that his plea "was not knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary because, due to his long-term use of 
methamphetamine, he was not competent when he pleaded guilty." (Appellant's 
brief, p.12.) McCabe's argument fails. The district court correctly concluded that 
McCabe's claim is refuted by the record and, as such, McCabe failed to carry his 
burden of demonstrating any manifest injustice entitling him to post-sentencing 
withdrawal of his guilty plea. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
"Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to 
whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished 
from arbitrary action." State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-536, 211 P.3d 
775, 780-781 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 362, 941 
P.2d 330, 334 (Ct. App. 1997)). An appellate court will defer to the trial court's 
factual findings if they are supported by substantial competent evidence. State v. 
Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 15 P.3d 1167 (2000); Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254, 
869 P.2d 571 (Ct. App. 1994). 
C. The District Court Correctly Concluded Gomez Failed To Show Any 
Manifest Injustice Entitling Him To Withdrawal Of His Guilty Plea 
Generally, a motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea will not be granted after 
sentencing. State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 787 P.2d 281, 284 (1990); 
Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146, 754 P.2d 458, 459 (Ct. App. 1988). A court 
may permit a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea after sentencing only upon a 
satisfactory showing by the defendant that withdrawal of the guilty plea is 
necessary to correct a "manifest injustice." I.C.R. 33(c); State v. Flowers, 150 
Idaho 568, 571, 249 P.3d 367, 370 (2011 ); State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95, 97, 
156 P.3d 1193, 1195 (2007). 
The strictness of the standard is justified by the legal weight of the guilty 
plea. "A plea of guilty has the same force and effect as a judgment rendered 
after a fuil trial on the merits." Schmidt v. State, 103 Idaho 340, 346, 647 P.2d 
796, 802 (Ct. App. 1982). The stricter standard also insures that the defendant is 
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not "encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight of potential punishment and 
withdraw the plea if the sentence is unexpectedly severe." State v. Stone, 147 
Idaho 330, 333, 208 P.3d 734, 737 (Ct. App. 2009). The defendant has the 
burden of proving that the plea should be withdrawn. bi_; State v. Gomez, 124 
Idaho 177, 178, 857 P.2d 656, 657 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Manifest injustice is established as a matter of law where a plea is "not 
taken in compliance with constitutional due process standards." State v. 
Thomas, 154 Idaho 305, 307, 297 P.3d 268, 270 (Ct. App. 2013); see also 
Heredia, 144 Idaho at 97, 156 P.3d at 1195. Constitutional due process 
standards require "that a guilty plea be made voluntarily, knowingly and 
intelligently," as shown by the "record of the entire proceedings, including 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom." Thomas, 154 Idaho at 307, 297 P.3d at 
270 (citing I.C.R. 11 (c)); accord Flowers, 150 Idaho at 572, 249 P.3d at 371. 
In Idaho, the trial court must follow the minimum requirements of !.C.R. 
11(c) in accepting guilty pleas. State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 180, 824 P.2d 
109, 111 (1991) (quoting State v. Detweiler, 115 Idaho 443, 446, 767 P.2d 286, 
289 (Ct. App. 1989)). If the record indicates that the trial court followed the 
requirements of I.C.R. 11(c), this is a prima facie showing that the plea is 
voluntary and knowing. Mauro, 121 Idaho at 180, 824 P.2d at 111. However, 
'[t]he failure to comply with Idaho Criminal Rule 11 does not, by itself, constitute 
manifest injustice." Flowers, 150 Idaho at 573, 249 P.3d at 372. As a matter of 
constitutional due process, a plea is knowing and voluntary if it is '"entered by 
one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any 
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commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel."' Brady 
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970). Because due process requires 
that a defendant be advised of the direct consequences of a guilty plea, the trial 
court is not constitutionally required to inform a defendant of consequences that 
are collateral or indirect. Flowers, 150 Idaho at 573, 249 P.3d at 372 ("Prior to 
accepting a guilty plea, a court is only required to inform the defendant of the 
direct consequences of the plea."); Jakoski v. State, 136 Idaho 280, 32 P.3d 672 
(Ct. App. 2001) (citation omitted) ("[D]ue process only requires that a defendant 
be informed of direct, as opposed to collateral consequences of a guilty plea."); 
see also Heredia, 144 Idaho at 97-98, 156 P.3d at 1195-96 (citing State v. 
Huffman, 137 Idaho 886, 887, 55 P.3d 879, 880 (Ct. App. 2002); Ray v. State, 
133 Idaho 96, 99-101, 982 P.2d 931, 934-36 (1999)) (under I.C.R. 11(c), which 
establishes the minimum requirements for taking a constitutionally valid guilty 
plea, "[t]he trial court is not required to inform a defendant of consequences that 
are collateral or indirect"). 
Prior to allowing McCabe to represent himself and ultimately enter into 
plea negotiations with the state which result in a guilty plea, the trial court 
determined McCabe was competent to proceed. The United States Supreme 
Court has said, "[t]here are ... no fixed or immutable signs which invariably 
indicate the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed .... " Drape v. 
Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975). "[E]vidence of a defendant's irrational 
behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to 
stand trial are all relevant in determining whether further inquiry is required." ~ 
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Other relevant factors include trial counsel's perceptions of the defendant's 
competence, the defendant's communications with the district court, and the 
defendant's ability to use legal terms appropriately. See State v. Hayes, 138 
Idaho 761, 764-65, 69 P.3d 181, 184-85 (Ct. App. 2003); United States v. 
Landers, 564 F.3d 1217, 1221 (10th Cir. 2009); Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 
567, 606 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217, 1233 (2nd 
Cir. 2002); United States v. Lewis, 991 F.2d 524, 528 (9th Cir. 1993). 
Examining the record as a whole, there is no indication that McCabe was 
unable to understand the nature of the proceedings against him or act as his own 
counsel. The trial court extensively questioned McCabe on his desire to 
represent himself, including McCabe's understanding of the charges against him 
and the potential penalties he was facing. (See generally, 3/4/13 Tr., pp.4-9.) 
The court noted McCabe had "never [previously] been disruptive" in its 
courtroom. (3/4/13 Tr., p.9, Ls.10-11.) There was also a discussion of McCabe's 
prior cases in which he represented himself in court: 
THE COURT: 
previously? 
Okay. Now, have you represented yourself 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I have. 
THE COURT: On approximately how many occasions? 
THE DEFENDANT: Twice, I believe. 
THE COURT: Okay. And how successful have you been in 
your self-representation? 
THE DEFENDANT: I got - I ended up doing 14 years on one, and I 
ended up getting the one case overturned on appeal, but I did 
ultimately win it. 
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(3/4/13 Tr., p.12, L.16- p.13, L.1.) 
The court also addressed McCabe's earlier declaration that he desired 
representation, but ultimately concluded after reviewing the discovery in the case 
that he could represent himself and desired to do so: 
THE COURT: And I believe when we were here a week or 
two ago, your indication was that you really needed a lawyer 
because you're facing the potential of life? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I - Yeah, I did relay that to the court. 
THE COURT: And why has your decision changed? 
THE DEFENDANT: Well, Your Honor, I just - I feel that I, you 
know, after reviewing the evidence and stuff like that, as long as 
everybody plays on an open field and plays aboveboard I feel that 
this thing could be resolved before trial. I really do. 
(3/4/13Tr., p.9, L.23-p.10, L.10.) 
Although McCabe filed extensive pro se documents with the court, it 
questioned McCabe's ability to present his arguments in a cogent manner to a 
jury if the matter proceeded to trial. (3/4/13 Tr., p.10, L.25 - p.11, L.9.) This 
concern was allayed through further questioning: 
THE COURT: Has - Now, I will say this from my prior 
experience with you, is that when it comes to writing, 
communicating in written form, you are very understandable, you're 
very knowledgeable, and you're very intelligent from your written 
forms of communication. 
I will say from my experience that i can't say the same as far 
as your verbal abilities to communicate. Many times your 
comments seem disjointed, confused, not full sentences, and my 
concern is your ability to communicate with the jury or ability to 
communicate properly with a witness if this matter were to proceed 
to trial. Do you understand what my concerns are? 
THE DEFENDANT: Most definitely, Your Honor. It's just that I -
this is - this is a hearing I'm unfamiliar with, and that's the whole 
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purpose of me coming to court a lot is to get accustomed to it like 
everybody else is so that I can speak the way I intend to speak as I 
do in my motion and stuff, my written motions. But, you know, 
between now and the time it takes to go to trial, if it does fo to trial, 
then I feel pretty comfortable in my ability to express myself to the 
jury. 
(3/4/13 Tr., p.10, L.25 - p.11, L.23.) 
Despite his claims to the contrary, the clear evidence from the record 
demonstrates McCabe's competence. Nothing in the record creates a genuine 
doubt as to McCabe's ability to understand the nature of the proceedings against 
him or represent himself. 
In its memorandum decision denying McCabe's motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea as well as his motion for a retroactive competency hearing, the district 
court applied the correct legal standards and set forth in detail the facts, drawn 
from the record, that demonstrate McCabe entered his plea knowingly, voluntarily 
and intelligently and with knowledge of the consequences thereof. Rather than 
repeat the district court's factual findings and legal conclusions, the state hereby 
adopts the district court's analysis, as set forth at pages 7 through 15 of the 
court's "Memorandum Decision Re: Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, I.C.R. 33(c)" 
(see Appendix A), and submits for the reasons recited therein that McCabe failed 
to establish any manifest injustice entitling him to withdraw his plea. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and 
sentence and the district court's order denying McCabe's motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 12th day of June, 2014, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
REED P. ANDERSON 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State pellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk' offi .. 
NLS/pm 
12 
APPENDIX A 
' . 
. i , 
-~, • ! ..... 
OFFICE oi:i:::i~~s~i~ENERAL /~Jdr1 e!~s~~ 26 
, .... --~ .. ·~---- . . ., . 
IN THE JDI§TfilCT COURT OJF THlE FIFTH JUDICIAL D~S.~----
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MELVIN ARTHUR MCCABE, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) Case No. CR 2013-317 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SCANNED 
--------------) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: DEFENDANT'§ MOTION TO WITHIDRA W 
GlliLTY PLEA, VC.R. 33(c) 
On October 25, 2013, the Defendant filed a Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty. On 
December 24, 2013, he filed an Amended Motion. 1 The Defendant filed a motion for 
appointment of counsel on October 29. 2013. He filed an affidavit with additional facts and 
claims on October 31, 2013. The Defendant is self-represented. 
On January 23, 2014 the State filed its Response to the defendant's motion and the 
Affidavit of Officer Jason Summers. The Court on January 27, 2014 heard oral argument on the 
defendant's motion. The defendant appeared telephonically and the State was represented by 
Paul R. Kroeger, Deputy Prosecutor. 
1 The defendant has also filed motions for (1) competency evaluation, LC. § I 8-21 0; 18-211; and (2) motion for 
production of GPS readings and hair follicle analysis. 
I • MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA, 1.C.R. 33(c) 
0 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCJEDURAL ffi§TORY 
An Infonnation was filed on February 5, 2013 charging the Defendant with Possession of 
a Controlled Substance with the Intent to Deliver (Idaho Code § 37-2732(a)); Driving Without 
Privileges (Idaho Code§ 18-8001); Possession of Drug Paraphernalia (Idaho Code§ 37-2734A); 
and Failure to Provide Proof of Insurance (Second Offense) (Idaho Code § 49-1232). An 
Information Part 2 was also filed, and it charged the Defendant as a persistent violator (Idaho 
Code § 19-2514). On May 13, 2013, an Amended Information Part 1 was filed charging the 
Defendant with Possession of a Controlled Substance (Methamphetamine) (Idaho Code § 37-
2732(c)(l)); Driving Without Privileges (Idaho Code § 18-8001); Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia (Idaho Code § 37-2734A); and Failure to Provide Proof of Insurance (Second 
Offense) (Idaho Code § 49-1232). An Amended Infonnation Part 2 was also filed notifying the 
Court that the State was seeking an enhanced penalty pursuant to Idaho Code§ 37-2739 based on 
the Defendant's prior drug convictions. 
On March 4, 2013 the court conducted a hearing on the defendant's motion for self-
representation. The court conducted an extensive Faretta inquiry and determined that the 
defendant's decision was a knowing, voluntary and intelligent decision. 
On April 3, 2013 the court entered an Order releasing the defendant from custody 
pursuant to a Stipulation of the defendant and the State. 
The Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress on April 16, 2013. He filed an Amended 
Motion to Suppress on April 19, 2013. Oral argument occurred on April 24, 2013. The Court 
denied the Motion to Suppress on May 2, 2013. 
2 - MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA, I.C.R. 33(c) 
0 
On May 13, 2013, the Defendant pled guilty to Count 1: Possession of a Controlled 
Substance (Methamphetamine), as set forth in the Amended Information Part 1. He also pled 
guilty knowing that the State was seekirJ.g a sentence enhancement, as set forth in the Amended 
Information Part 2. Under the plea agreement, the State recommended a 14 year sentence with 6 
years determinate. The State recommended that the Defendant serve his sentence in prison. On 
July 12, 2013, the Court sentenced the Defendant in accordance with the plea agreement. 
The Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on July 12, 2013. On September 26, 2013, he 
filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 Motion for Correction or Reduction in Sentence. The Court 
denied the Motion on October 8, 2013. 
IL 
JUDJrCIAL NOTICE 
The Court, pursuant to Rule 201 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, hereby takes judicial notice 
of the transcript of the entry of guilty plea dated May 13, 2013. 
llII. 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
The question of whether to grant a motion for appointment of counsel in a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea is a matter of discretion. See Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 164 P.3d 
798 (2007). A post-judgment motion to withdraw a plea of guilty is not a critical stage of the 
criminal proceedings for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. State v. Hartshorn, 149 Idaho 454, 
458, 235 P.3d 404, 408 (Ct. App. 2010). However, the court must address the request for 
appointment of counsel before ruling on the substantive issues in the case. Charboneau v. State, 
140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004). In Workman, the court stated the following 
standard: 
3 • MEMORANDUM DECISION RE; DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA, I.C.R. 33(c) 
Id. 
A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conv1ct10n 
proceeding is governed by LC. § 19A904. Quinlan v. Idaho 
Comm'nfor Pardons and Parole, 138 Idaho 726, 730, 69 P.3d 146, 
150 (2003). Idaho Code § 19-4904 provides that in a proceeding 
under the UPCPA, a court-appointed attorney "may be made 
available" to an indigent applicant. The decision to grant or deny a 
request for court-appointed counsel lies vvithin the discretion of the 
district court. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 
1108, 1111 (2004). This Court determined in Charboneau, and 
reaffirmed in Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 152 P.3d 12 (2007), 
that the proper standard for determining whether to appoint 
counsel for an indigent petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding 
is whether the petition alleges facts showing the possibility of a 
valid claim that would require further investigation on the 
defendant's behalf. Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 
1112; Swader, 143 Idaho at 654, 152 P.3d at 15. 
Therefore, this Court looks to the allegations in the motion to determine if the Defendant has 
alleged sufficient facts to show the possibility of a valid claim requiring further investigation. 
Inferences are draivn in the Defendant's favor, and the Court may only deny a request for 
counsel if all claims are frivolous. Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22, 24, 218 P .3d 1, 3 (Ct. App. 2009). 
"[S]ome claims are so patently frivolous that they simply cannot be developed into viable claims 
even with the assistance of counsel." Hust v. State, 147 Idaho 682,685,214 P.3d 668,671 (Ct 
App. 2009). 
In determining whether to appoint counsel for the Defendant, the Court must first 
determine whether the claims are frivolous. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P .3d 
1108, 1111 (2004). 
Idaho Code § 19-852(b)(3) sets forth the standard for 
detennining whether or not a post-conviction proceeding is 
frivolous. It is frivolous if it is "not a proceeding that a 
reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to 
bring at his own expense.,, When applying that standard to 
pro se applications for appointment of counsel, the trial 
court should keep in mind that petitions and affidavits filed 
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Id 
by a pro se petitioner will often be conclusory and 
incomplete. Although facts sufficient to state a claim may 
not be alleged because they do not exist, they also may not 
be alleged because the pro se petitioner simply does not 
know what are the essential elements of a claim. 
In evaluating the Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty and the supporting documents, it 
appears that the Motion is not one that a reasonable person with adequate means would be 
willing to file at his or her own expense. Id This Court acknowledges that pro se defendants will 
often include conclusory statements in their motions and affidavits and that there may be 
sufficient facts to support their claims that they have not alleged. Id. However, it is also possible 
that such facts do not exist, and this could . be the reason a defendant has not included them. 
Moreover, certain claims are frivolous and could not be developed into valid claims even with 
the assistance of counsel and the admission of more facts. Hust v. State, 14 7 Idaho 682, 685, 214 
P.3d 668, 671. 
Even if this Court were to grant the Defendant's Motion for Appointment of Counsel, 
counsel would not be able to develop the Defendant's claims into valid claims. The Defendant's 
claim that his plea was coerced because the prosecutor unlawfully used the persistent violator 
charge in plea negotiations is a frivolous claim that a reasonable person with adequate means 
would not bring forth at his or her own expense. This is because the argument that the statute 
only applies to a third felony conviction and not any subsequent felony convictions is invalid. 
Counsel could do nothing to help the Defendant develop this claim into a viable claim, as courts 
have said that Idaho Code Section 19-2514 aJ)f'Mes to all felony convictions after a second felony 
conviction. State v. Bates, 63 Idaho 119, 117 P.2d 281 (1941) ("Obviously the legislature never 
intended by such statute that one would be a persistent violator upon the conviction of a third 
offense but not upon a fourth or any subsequent one."). 
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The Defendant's other two claims that his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, or 
intelligent also fail because they are not claims that a reasonable person with adequate means 
would be willing to bring at his or her own expense. His claim that he was denied access to 
research resources while on house arrest is disproved by the record, and counsel would not help 
develop this claim into a viable claim. Moreover, the claim that he was under the influence of 
drugs and prescription medication that affects his ability to reason is also disproved by the 
record. Therefore, it is also a claim that counsel would not be able to develop into a viable claim. 
The Court determines through a reasoned exercise of discretion that the Defendant has 
failed to show the possibility of a valid claim requiring further investigation. Therefore, the 
Motion for Appointment of Counsel is DENIED. 
IV. 
RULE 33(c) STANDARl!) 
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) governs a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. I.C.R. 339(c). A 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea that is made after sentencing can only be granted to correct a 
manifest injustice. State v. Ward, 135 Idaho 68, 72, 14 P.3d 388, 391 (Ct. App. 2000). The 
standard is strict to ensure that a defendant "is not encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight 
of potential punishment and withdraw the plea if the sentence were unexpectedly severe." Id A 
less strict standard is used for a motion to withdraw a guilty plea that is made prior to sentencing. 
State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799, 801, 761 P.2d 1151, 1153 (1988). "The defendant has the 
burden of demonstrating a manifest injustice" when he or she moves the court to withdraw a 
guilty plea after he or she is sentenced. State v. Detweiler, 115 Idaho 443, 446, 767 P.2d 286, 
289 (Ct. App. 1989). 
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A plea that has been made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently usually cannot be 
withdrawn after sentencing. State v. Hayes, 138 Idaho 761, 765, 69 P.3d 181, 185 (Ct. App. 
2003). 
If the record indicates the trial court followed the 
requirements of LC.R. 1 l(c), this is a prima facie showing 
that the plea is voluntary and knowing." The defendant then 
has the burden of persuasion to demonstrate a manifest 
injustice by establishing that the plea was induced by 
misapprehension, inadvertence or ignon;nce. 
State v. Detweiler, 115 Idaho 443, 445-46, 767 P.2d 286, 288-28. 
V. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Motion for CompeteHllty lEvaluatfon. 
The defendant seeks to have this court as part of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
order that he submit to a competency evaluation pursuant to LC. § 18-210, et seq. to determine 
his competency at the time he waived his right to counsel and at the time of the entry ofhls plea. 
I.C. § 18-210 provides that provides that "No person who as a result of mental disease or 
defect lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense 
shall be tried, convicted, sentenced or punished for the commission of an offense so long as such 
incapacity endures." The issue as to a defendant's fitness to proceed or to defend himself is 
always a matter of discretion for the trial court and the court through the pendency of the 
proceeding up to and including sentencing has a duty to observe the defendant's ability to 
understand the proceedings against him. State v. Potter, 109 Idaho 967, 712 P.2d 668 (Ct. App. 
1985). However, the provisions of I.C. § 18-210, et seq. do not compel or require the court to 
order a competency evaluation after sentencing and the entry of a Judgment of Conviction. 
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The defendant's claim at this time of lack of competency is based on his long history of 
substance abuse with methamphetamine. The court was at all relevant times familiar with the 
defendant's substance abuse history, however, the court was also satisfied that his history of 
substance use did not impair his ability to understand the proceeding leading up to the entry of 
his Judgment of Conviction in this matter. The defendant up to the time that he had elected to 
represent himself had been in custody in the Jerome County Jail for approximately 45 days 
(1/22/2013 to 31712013 ). The court conducted a Faretta inquiry of the defendant and determined 
that the defendant's decision to represent himself was a knowing, voluntary and intelligent 
decision. At no time did the defendant's behavior, actions, conduct or writing's ever suggest to 
the court that he did not understand the proceedings against him. Further, at the time of the entry 
of his guilty plea an extensive colloquy between the defendant and the court never suggested that 
the defendant did not know what he was doing or the he did not understand the nature or 
consequences of his guilty plea. The defendant at no time at or before sentencing raised the issue 
of his competency and at no time did this court have any doubt as to the capacity of competency 
of the defendant to understand the nature and consequences of his plea. State v. Hawkins, 148 
Idaho 774,778,229 P.3d 379,383 (Ct. App. 2009). 
There is no legal or factual basis for this court to believe that the defendant was not 
competent to understand the proceedings as the law requires and there is no legal basis at this 
time to order a competency evaluation at this stage of the proceedings. The defendant request for 
a competency evaluation is DENIED. 
B. Motion for GPS Readings and Hair Follicle Analysis 
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The defendant seeks to have this court order that GPS readings be produced and that he 
submit to a hair follicle analysis to prove that he was "in a state of methamphetamine induced 
incompetence and/or sufficiently under the influence to impair his ability to understand" the 
proceedings against him including his waiver of counsel and the entry of his guilty plea. 
The defendant pursuant to an agreement was released from custody on or about April 3, 
2013. Pursuant to the agreement and the Order of the Court, the defendant was released from 
custody with "GPS Monitoring" and on a number of conditions which included where he could 
travel to; where he was to reside; and random drug testing. The GPS device was just to monitor 
the location of the defendant and was not designed to detect drugs or alcohol, and that in part 
was why the defendant could be subject to random drug testing. Further, a hair follicle analysis 
would be of no assistance since such an analysis would only indicate whether the defendant had 
used rnethamphetamine in the past not when his last use might have been. Depending on what 
hair is used for such an analysis, such as head, facial or body hair, such an analysis may show 
use of methamphetamine within 90 days to one year and does not indicate whether a person is 
"under the influence" at any particular time. Therefore, the Motion for the production of GPS 
readings and a hair follicle analysis is DENIED. 
C. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea 
The Defendant argues that the Court should grant his Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty 
in order to correct raanifest injustice. He argues that his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, 
or intelligent, for three reasons. First, he argues that the persistent violator statute does not apply 
to him, and the prosecutor unlawfully used the persistent violator charge in plea negotiations. He 
maintains that his guilty plea was induced because it was based on this error. Second, he argues 
that his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent because he was denied access to 
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legal research resources while he was _on house arrest. Third, the Defendant argues that he was 
under the influence of Methamphetamine during the various hearings on his case, and this caused 
him to be unable to adequately or coherently address issues related to his case. He asserts that he 
did not have the mental state necessary to be held responsible for the crimes of which he was 
convicted or to waive his right to counsel. 
1. The Defem::fai.nt's Gimilty Plea Was Knowing, Vohnnntmry and fotemgent, a!llld the 
Prosecutor Did Not Illegally Use Idaho Code § 19-2514 in Plea Negotiations. 
The Defendant argues that his guilty plea "was induced behind the coercive use of Idaho 
Code [Section] 19-2514, when application of the enhancement provisions were inapplicable and 
unenforceable beyond Defendant's conviction of the third felony." (Mot. to Withdraw Plea of 
Guilty 2). He asserts that the prosecutor unlawfully induced him to plead guilty by threatening to 
charge him as a persistent violator. Id. He maintains that he could not have been charged as a 
persistent violator anyway because the prosecutor is estopped by laches of charging him as such. 
Id Furthermore, the mandatory language of the statute precludes the prosecutor from being able 
to charge him as a persistent violator. Id He argues that he cannot be charged and convicted as a 
persistent violator because Idaho Code Section 19-2514 is only applicable to one's third felony, 
and the Defendant has been convicted of more than three felonies. Id. at 3. The Defendant 
maintains that since the prosecutor illegally used the persistent violator statute to induce him to 
plead guilty, his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent. Id. He asserts that it 
would be a "grave miscarriage of justice" if this Court permits this "prosecutorial malfeasance." 
Id at 3-4. 
If the record indicates the trial court followed the 
requirements ofI.C.R. l l(c), this is a prima facie showing 
that the plea is voluntary and knowing." The defendant then 
has the burden of persuasion to demonstrate a manifest 
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injustice by establishing that the plea was induced by 
misapprehension, inadvertence or ignorance. 
State v. Detweiler, 115 Idaho 443, 445A6, 767 P.2d 286, 288-28. 
A prima facie showing that a guilty plea was voluntary and knowing is made if the court 
followed the requirements ofidaho Criminal Rule l l(c). State v. Detweiler, 115 Idaho 443, 445-
46, 7 67 P .2d 286, 288-28. Idaho Criminal Rule 11 ( c) reads as follows: 
(c) Acceptance of Plea of Guilty. Before a plea of guilty is 
accepted, the record of the entire proceedings, including 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, must show: 
(1) The voluntariness of the plea. 
(2) The defendant was informed of the consequences of the 
plea, including minimum and maximum punishments, and 
other direct consequences which may apply. 
(3) The defendant was advised that by pleading guilty the 
defendant would waive the right against compulsory self-
incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to 
confront witnesses against the defendant. 
( 4) The defendant was informed of the nature of the charge 
against the defendant. 
(5) Whether any promises have been made to the 
defendant, or whether the plea is a result of any plea 
bargaining agreement, and if so, the nature of the 
agreement and that the defendant was informed that the 
court is not bound by any promises or recommendation 
from either party as to punishment. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 1 l(c). 
In State v. Detweiler, the court found that the defendant's guilty plea was knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent, and it held that no manifest injustice occurred through mistake or 
misapprehension. State v. Detweiler, 115 Idaho 443, 767 P.2d 286 (Ct. App. 1989). The 
defendant's attorney told him that his BAC results were way over the limit when they were not. 
Id at 446, 289. The court found that even if the attorney told the defendant this, it would not 
have been a misrepresentation to the degree of manifest injustice. Id "This is in contrast with a 
mistake or misapprehension of the elements of a crime the state must prove to obtain a verdict of 
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guilty, which mistake, if established, would be a manifest injustice." Id The court determined 
that the record showed that the defendant fully understood his rights including the possible 
consequences of his plea Id It found that there was a prima facie showing that his plea was 
voluntary and knowing because the court followed the requirements of Idaho Criminal Rule 
1 l(c). Id "The mistake or misapprehension experienced by [the defendant] did not diminish his 
understanding of the offense charged [or] the possible punishments or the consequences of his 
plea. Id 
The Court followed all of the requirements of Idaho Criminal Rule 1 l(c). The Court 
informed the Defendant of the consequences of his guilty plea, and it notified him of the 
maximum sentence he faced. He was advised that he would be waiving his right to counsel, 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to a jury trial, and his right to confront 
witnesses against him, if he pleaded guilty. The Court advised the Defendant of the nature of the 
charges against him, and it asked him if any promises had been made to him. Moreover, the 
Court informed him that it was not bound by any plea agreement that the Defendant made with 
the prosecutor. The Court finds that the requirements of Idaho Criminal Rule 11 ( c) were met, 
and there is aprimafacie showing that the Defendant's guilty plea was voluntary and knowing. 
The Defendant has not met his burden of demonstrating that a manifest injustice occurred 
because his guilty plea was induced by inadvertence, misapprehension, or ignorance. His 
argument that his guilty plea was induced due to the prosecutor's unlawful use of a persistent 
violator charge in plea negotiations is unpersuasive. Idaho Code Section I 9-2514 did in fact 
apply to him, and it was neither unlawful for the prosecutor to charge the Defendant as a 
persistent violator in the Information Part 2 nor was it unlawful to use it in plea negotiations. The 
defendant in· State v. Bates attempted to make this same argument, and he was unsuccessful. 
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State v. Bates, 63 Idaho 119, 117 P.2d 281 (1941). "Obviously the legislature never intended by 
such statute that one would be a persistent violator upon the conviction of a third offense but not 
upon a fourth or any subsequent one:' Id 
2. The Defe]l]dant'.§ Guilty lP'lea Was Knowing, Vohm.tary amd foteUigent, and the 
Argument That it Was Not lBecause he was Denied Access to Research Resources .Fails. 
The Defendant argues that his guilty plea was involuntary because he was denied 
adequate access to legal research resources while he was on house arrest. Id at 4. He maintains 
that once he was allowed to be released to house arrest, he no longer had access to research 
resources and was denied access to the local library. Id. He argues that had he been allowed to 
access the research resources, he would have been able to properly address evidentiary issues 
that would have resulted in certain evidence being excluded based on the exclusionary rule. Id at 
5. 
The record disproves the Defendant's allegations that he requested and was denied access 
to legal research resources. The defendant hlmself agreed to the terms of his release from 
custody and if he was unable to conduct research he could have made requests of the court which 
he did not. While he was released from custody he was in fact able to file with the court 
memorandums in support of his motion to suppress with legal authorities. Further the terms of 
his release permitted him to travel to the Jerome County Judicial Annex where he would have 
had access to the public computer resource for legal research. During the change of plea hearing, 
the Court asked the Defendant if he had conducted all of the discovery that he wanted to conduct 
in the matter. (Change of Plea Tr. 20:20-22). Furthennore, the Court asked rum if there was any 
inforrp.ation that he had requested from the State that the State had not provided him. Id. at 
20:23-21 :5). The Defendant was later asked if he had any questions for the Court. Id at 22: 11-
13. The Defendant never indicated that he was denied access to resources or needed access to 
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resources. The record disproves the Defendant's claim that his guilty plea was not !mowing, 
voluntary, or intelligent due to inadequate access to resources. 
3. The Defendant's Waiver of Counsel and Guilty Plea Was Knowing, Voluntary 
and Intelligent, and the Defendant's claim of Alleged Drug Use Throughout the 
Proceedillllgs of His Case Does Not Alter This. 
The Defendant argues that his waiver of counsel and his guilty plea were not knowing, 
voluntary, or intelligent because he "was suffering from drug induced mental incompetence" and 
was "unable to understand the nature and/or consequences of a waiver of counsel or guilty plea." 
(Aff. of Melvin A. McCabe 3). He maintains that he was using Methamphetamine throughout the 
history of his case. Id at 2. In his Amended Motion, the Defendant claims that he was on 
prescription medication at the time of his entry of plea. (Amended Motion 5-6). 2 
As for the defendant's waiver of counsel, the court conducted an extensive Faretta 
inquiry on March 4, 2013 and the court was satisfied that the defendant made a valid waiver of 
counsel and that the waiver was not the result of being under the influence of controlled 
substances or any claim of diminished capacity. 3 
The Defendant's guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, and the record 
disproves that he was in a drug-induced state during his entry of a guilty plea. During the change 
of plea hearing, the Court asked the Defendant if he was under the influence of any drugs or 
alcohol, and the Defendant stated that he was not. (Change of Plea Tr. 10:1-4; May 13, 2013). It 
also asked him if he was taking any medication that would affect his ability to make a reasoned 
2 For a waiver of counsel to be knowing and intelligent, the defendant must be aware of the nature of the charges 
filed against him or her, the penalties that may result from those charges, and the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation. See Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 64, 90 P.3d 278, 289; State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 865, 781 P.2d 
197, 202 (1989); see also United States·v. Harris, 683 F.2d 322, 324-25 (9th Cir.1982).The defendant claims _that 
his waiver of counsel in March, 2013 was defective because of drug use. However, at the time that he had waived 
his right to counsel he had been in custody from January 22, 2013 to April, 2016. Therefore his claim of illicit drug 
use is not supported by the record at the time he waived counsel. 
3 The court has a distinct recollection of the March 4, 2013 bearing and has also listened to the digital recording of 
the March 4, 2013 hearing wherein the defendant waived counsel. 
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or informed decision, and he said he was not. Id. at 10:5-8. The Defendant's claim that he was 
unable to understand the consequences of a guilty plea fails because it is disproved by the record. 
The court observed the demeanor of the defendant and the defendant's behavior and responses to 
the court's questions did not indicate that the defendant was under the influence of any drugs, 
prescription or illegal dmgs.4 Since the change of plea transcript disproves the Defendant's 
allegation that he was under the influence of drugs or prescription medication that affects his 
ability to reason, his argument that his plea was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent based on 
his drug-induced state fails. 
The Court followed the requirements of Idaho Criminal Rule 11 ( c ). The Defendant has 
not met his burden of demonstrating that a manifest injustice occurred by the entry of his guilty 
plea. The guilty plea was not induced by inadvertence, misapprehension, or ignorance on the part 
of the defendant nor was it a product of a drug induced condition. 
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above review by the Court, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and Motion for Appointment of Counsel are 
DENIED. This Court finds that no manifest injustice has occurred. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 3 day o~l}Ml{, 2014. 
4 Officer Summers in his Affidavit states he has had previous encounters with the defendant and that he is trained in 
recognizing whether an individual may be under the influence of controlled substances and states he was present 
when the defendant was engaged in plea negotiations with the prosecutor and that his observations of the defendant 
did not indicate that the defendant was under the influence of a controlled. substance. 
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